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von Herman Roodenburg
Is historical anthropology only a German thing? Of course, it is also
practiced in Austria and German-speaking Switzerland, but I am fairly
certain that few cultural historians outside these three countries would
still describe their work as historical anthropology, let alone that they
would organize an internet forum on the subject. Indeed, for most
of them historical anthropology seems to be something of the past.
Like Peter Burke, they may see it as merely a „moment“ in cultural
history, roughly the 1970s and 1980s - during which cultural histori-
ans had a special affinity with social and cultural anthropology. This
moment ended in the late 1980s with the emergence of a „new cul-
tural history“ drawing on a plurality of approaches and disciplines
ranging from Mikhail Bakhtin and Michel Foucault to gender studies,
cultural studies or media studies.1 German as well as Austrian and
Swiss historians followed suit, speaking of the neue Kulturgeschichte
or Kulturgeschichte in general. Yet they also held on to historische
Anthropologie, even launching a journal by that name in 1993 and
writing several introductions to the field.2
Perhaps cultural history is like Volkskunde (an important influence
on historische Anthropologie) a Vielnamenfach. Let us not spend too
much energy on such discussions. However, worthy of note (and the
subject of my paper) is the renewed interest in anthropology among
cultural historians. Historical anthropology seems to be back again
under a different guise. Two developments stand out. First, there
has been a veritable explosion of historical studies on the senses and
the emotions, many of them inspired by anthropological studies on
sensory and emotional cultures outside the West. Second, a growing
1Peter Burke, What is Cultural History? Cambridge 2004, pp. 30-48.
2Gert Dressel, Historische Anthropologie. Eine Einführung, Wien 1996; Richard van
Dülmen, Historische Anthropologie. Entwicklung, Probleme, Aufgaben, Köln 2004;
Jakob Tanner, Historische Anthropologie zur Einführung, Hamburg 2004.
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number of cultural historians, myself included, have become interested
in issues of body and mind. Not satisfied with studying a single sense
or emotion or studying the senses and the emotions as hardly related to
each other, they have turned to Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of the habitus
or to other anthropologists and social scientists working with similar
phenomenological approaches to the body. Like these anthropologists
they explore the uses of twentieth-century phenomenology, especially
the writings of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Distancing themselves from
the mentalism of the linguistic turn, which so much dominated both
the historical anthropology of the 1970s and 1980s and the new cul-
tural history, they prefer to draw on the present phenomenological or
corporeal turn. It is this second, emerging development that I would
like to outline in this paper. I will focus on the cultural history of
images (one of my own fields of interests), more specifically on the
viewers’ bodily, sensory and emotional response to images.
1. Michael Baxandall
My starting point is Michael Baxandall’s well-known study on painting
and experience in fifteenth-century Italy, published in 1972. In it
Baxandall introduced his notion of the „period eye“, the equipment
that a contemporary public brings to complex visual stimulations
like pictures. He concentrated on what he ironically summarized
as the church-going business man, with a taste for dancing, arguing
that the perception, the cognitive skills and ways of seeing, of these
well-do-merchants who commissioned the paintings was strongly
informed by their everyday experiences, by such routine practices as
gauging visually the volumes of barrels as well as their social dancing
or their listening to and watching a sermon. Interestingly, Bourdieu
admired the period eye. As Allan Langdale, one of Baxandall’s pupils,
concluded, he may have even „grasped the concept’s potential more
than anyone else“.3
3Michael Baxandall, Painting and Experience in Fifteenth Century Italy, Oxford 1972;
Allan Langdale, Aspects of the Critical Reception and Intellectual History of Baxandall’s
Concept of the Period Eye, in: Adrian Rifkin (ed.), About Michael Baxandall, Oxford
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In fact, until reading Langdale’s essay on the critical reception of the
period eye, I was unaware of Bourdieu’s interest and was fascinated
to learn that Baxandall had gained the admiration of both Bourdieu
and Clifford Geertz, whose theories of culture differ so completely.
Geertz was one of the most prominent advocates of the linguistic
turn, construing culture as a plurality of „texts“ we can „read“, while
Bourdieu, in developing his own concept of the habitus and thereby
drawing on Merleau-Ponty, already anticipated the present corporeal
or phenomenological turn.
In the following pages I will compare how both social scientists
adopted Baxandall’s notion of the period eye, but will focus on Bour-
dieu’s adoption, as I believe that the present phenomenological turn in
cultural history may profit considerably from Bourdieu’s and Baxan-
dall’s central interest in our embodied skills and habits, in the infusion
of our bodies with history. Practice theory should play an important
role4, if only as a corrective to the all too fashionable interest in the
neurosciences, in particular the research on our mirror neurons.
2. Clifford Geertz
Let us start with Clifford Geertz, who approved of Painting and Expe-
rience already in his 1976 essay „Art as a Cultural System“. Leafing
through the last pages of the book we understand why. There Baxan-
dall observed: „An old picture is the record of visual activity. One has
to learn to read it, just as one has to learn to read a text from a different
culture, even when one knows, in a limited sense, the language: both
language and pictorial representation are conventional activities“. As
he continued, „the pictures become documents as valid as any charter
or parish role“.5
It is illuminating to compare this final observation with a very
1999, pp. 17-35.
4For a similar (and excellent) argument focusing on the cultural history of emotions,
see Monique Scheer, Are Emotions a Kind of Practice (And Is That What Makes Them
Have a History?) A Bourdieuan Approach to Understanding Emotion, in: History and
Theory 51 (May 2012), pp. 193-220.
5Baxandall, Painting and Experience, p. 152.
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similar one made a year earlier, in 1975, by Natalie Zemon Davis. She
wrote, „as cultural artifacts a journeymen’s initiation rite, a village
festive organization (...) or a street disturbance could be ‘read’ as
fruitfully as a diary, a political tract, a sermon, or a body of laws“.
Or take Robert Darnton, another cultural historian much inspired
by Geertz. In his The Great Cat Massacre, published in 1984, he
noted: „one can read a ritual or a city in the same way just as one
can read a folktale or a philosophical text“.6 This was the linguistic
turn all over. In the 1970s and 1980s many cultural historians and
also art and literary historians followed in the same tracks, though
unfortunately few cultural historians working on the early modern
period also investigated images.
In his essay Geertz devoted some eight pages to the period eye,
and praised the book as a whole. As he informs us, „it takes precisely
the sort of approach I here am advocating“, and that approach was
of course a „semiotic science of art“. He dismisses the view, perhaps
found only in the West, that „technical talk about art“ – talking in
craft terms such as „harmony“ or „pictorial composition“ – would
suffice to understand art. Instead, he wishes to contextualize art, to
situate it in the wider context of other „expressions of human purpose“
such as religion, morality, science, commerce, technology, politics,
amusements, or law. After all, an artist works with signs that have a
place in semiotic systems extending far beyond the craft he practices.7
It is also this contextualizing perspective, the wish to study even the
most diverse phenomena in terms of each other, which many cultural
historians would derive from Geertz. One of them was the critic
Stephen Greenblatt who along with the art historian Svetlana Alpers
co-chaired the founding board of Representations, one of the linguistic
turn’s most important journals. In the „new historicism“ as advocated
6Natalie Zemon Davis, Society and Culture in Early Modern France, Stanford (CA)
1975; Robert Darnton, The Great Cat Massacre and other Episodes in French Cultural
History, New York 1984, pp. 5.
7Clifford Geertz, Art as a Cultural System, in: idem, Local Knowledge: Further
Essays in Interpretive Anthropology, New York 1983, pp. 102-109.
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by Greenblatt, each literary work should be situated „in relation to
other representational practices operative in the culture at a given
moment“. Or to quote Alpers, „Art, as Clifford Geertz has shown us,
is part and parcel of a cultural system“.8
Geertz quoted liberally from Painting and Experience. We are in-
formed about the importance of visual skills and habits, both to the
painters and their audiences. We read about the merchants’ everyday
practices of gauging barrels and how this skill enhanced their visual
sense of concrete mass, their recognizing of, for instance, cylinders or
cones. We also read about dancing, sharpening the merchants’ skill at
interpreting figure patterns, or their watching the bodily eloquence of
preachers, with their „stylized physical expressions of feeling“. Hav-
ing sketched this complex visual equipment, Baxandall even spoke
of Piero della Francescas „gauged sort of painting“, Fra Angelico’s
„preached sort of painting“, and Botticelli’s „danced sort of painting“ –
all examples, according to Geertz, of how painting in fifteenth-century
Italy was related to a plurality of semiotic systems extending far be-
yond itself. But there are two notable omissions in Geertz’s account.
He did not indicate Baxandalls interest in the workings of the brain, as
demonstrated in Painting and Experience (and in later publications as
well), nor did he mention Baxandall’s interest in the actual inculcation
of skills, which is certainly the most revealing omission. Baxandall’s
point that the period eye – involving all of these bodily and sensory
skills of gauging, preaching, dancing and, of course, painting – is
always inculcated, left him cold, and he failed to notice that Baxan-
dall repeatedly speaks of a „disposition“, developed through such
processes of inculcation, „to address visual experience“. However, it
was just these features that fascinated Bourdieu, and so let us continue
with his interpretation of the period eye.
3. Pierre Bourdieu
8Stephen Greenblatt, Resonance and Wonder, in: Bulletin of the American Academy
of Arts and Sciences 43 (1990), 4, p. 20; Svetlana Alpers, The Art of Describing: Dutch
Art in the Seventeenth Century, Chicago 1983, p. 8.
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According to my teachers at the University of Amsterdam – undoubt-
edly influenced by the Anglo-American reception of Bourdieu as essen-
tially a „conflict theorist“ – habitus was not too interesting a concept.
They described it as a more complex equivalent of taste, part of the
elite’s more implicit arsenal of strategies in social closure.9 It was only
after re-reading Bourdieu, trying to understand his appreciation of
the period eye, that I discovered how strongly his thinking on habitus
had been informed by phenomenology, and in particular by Mau-
rice Merleau-Ponty, his most important teacher at the École Normale
Supérieure. Underlying his notion of the habitus and his enthusiastic
response to the period eye was his teacher’s philosophical rehabilita-
tion of the body, of bodily knowing and bodily skills, and his teacher’s
opening up of philosophy to the historical and the social sciences.10
To briefly summarize, Bourdieu described the habitus as a system
of embodied feelings and thoughts, functioning at every moment as a
kind of „scheme“ or „disposition“, a matrix of all our perceptions, ap-
preciations and actions. He stressed the habitus’ generative and largely
prereflective nature, and drew attention to the central role of early so-
cialization and training. The schemes or dispositions constituting the
habitus have been inculcated, even literally „incorporated“, from the
very first days of life, thus turning „history“ into „nature“, into bodily
automatisms. Of course, musicians, especially jazz pianists, know such
automatisms well, their improvisations hinge on such intertwining of
body and mind.11 But they were already described by Descartes (who
never was the confirmed cartesian that so many twentieth-century
philosophers and scientists would make of him). In a letter written in
1640 to his friend Marin Mersenne, he professed his belief that all our
9On this reception, see Omar Lizardo, The Cognitive Origins of Bourdieu’s Habitus,
in: Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 34 (2004) 4, pp. 376-377.
10On these important influences, see Jeremy F Lane, Pierre Bourdieu: A Critical
Introduction, London and Sterling 2000, pp. 102; Marie-Anne Lescouret, Bourdieu. Vers
une économie du bonheur, Paris 2008, pp. 19-20, 25, 56-57, 136-139, 169-170, 176.
11See for instance the famous study by David Sudnow, both jazz pianist and eth-
nomethodologist: Ways of the Hand: The Organization of Improvised Conduct, Cam-
bridge Ma. 1978.
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nerves and muscles serve the memory. He continued, „so that a lute
player, for instance, has a part of his memory in his hands; for the ease
of bending and positioning his fingers in various ways, which he has
acquired by practice, helps him to remember the passages which need
these positions when they are played“.12 In other words, processes of
inculcation, of all kinds of skills already instilled from early childhood
on, are central to the habitus concept and became even more so in
Bourdieu’s later, more historically oriented thought. It was also this
incorporatory dimension that was emphasized by Bruno Latour. As
he noted: „This is why Bourdieu’s notion of habitus, once it is freed
from its social theory, remains such an excellent concept.“13
Bourdieu devoted two essays to the period eye: one in 1981, also
quoted by Langdale, and another, relatively unknown one in his Les
Règles de l’Art, published in 1992.14 Bourdieu was hardly interested in
a semiotic theory of art. On the contrary, right at the start of the latter
essay he faulted his earlier musings on artistic perception as being
too „intellectualist“, as construing such perception merely as an act
of „reading“ or „decoding“, the kind of analysis he deemed typical of
the Panofskyan and, especially, the „semiological“ tradition, then at
its peak. Bourdieu objected to the one-sidedness, the limitations, of
such linguistic approaches. He observed that they overlook the un-
derstanding „immediately available to an indigenous contemporary“.
They omit the practical schemes and dispositions involved in such
understanding, those „which never crop up as such in consciousness“.
In his view, scholars studying the perception of art should always
include this native comprehension, which unlike their own under-
standing has no theory or concept, is largely bodily and prereflective
12Quoted in T.J. Reiss, Denying the Body? Memory and the Dilemmas of History in
Descartes, in: Journal of the History of Ideas 57 (1996), pp. 587-607.
13Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory,
Oxford 2005, pp. 209 n. 280.
14Pierre Bourdieu / Yvette Dessault, Pour une sociologie de la perception, in: Actes
de la Recherce en Sciences Sociales 40 (1989), pp. 3-9; I used the English translation of
Les règles de l’art : Pierre Bourdieu, The Social Genesis of the Eye, in: idem, The Rules
of Art, Cambridge 1996, pp. 313-321.
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in nature. This was Baxandall’s central and innovative insight accord-
ing to Bourdieu, close to his own notions of habitus and practice. The
schemes of perception and appreciation involved in the merchants’
immediate comprehension of art derived from their everyday life,
their daily and multisensory experience of the sermon, the dance and
the market. As Bourdieu concluded, this aesthetics differed greatly
from Kant’s and its reconstruction required a „real labour of historical
ethnology“.15
3. Aesthesis
Bourdieu and Geertz, then, took up what they recognized the most
from Painting and Experience. In the meantime, judging from the
book’s more recent critical reception, Geertz’s semiotic adoption seems
to have lost much of its former relevance. For instance, take the art
historian Christopher Wood’s obituary written in 2008. Looking back
at Baxandall’s publications, he singled out Painting and Experience
as the real marvel. He wrote, „Here Baxandall asked the reader, in
effect, to occupy the body of the fifteenth-century Florentine patron
of altarpieces and frescoes (...)“. He continued: „For the first time the
reader was invited to participate in the historically remote everyday
by a process of bodily triangulation: We would feel with our bodies,
and see with our embodied eyes, what the beholders of Masaccio and
Filippo Lippi saw. Baxandall tells us this is strange knowledge that
we need to work to acquire, like ethnologists.“16 Obviously, this is
the corporeal and not the linguistic turn (and Wood may have seen
Bourdieu’s remark on historical ethnology).
Bourdieu, Wood and others who thoroughly examined Painting
and Experience were undoubtedly right in recognizing some fledgling
indications of the present bodily turn. We can indeed only marvel at
the richness of the book. It did not only suggest a Geertzian cultural
history of images but also, in its notable focus on skills and habits
15Ibid., pp. 313-316.
16Christopher Wood, When Attitudes Became Form: Christopher Wood on Michael
Baxandall (1933-2008), in: ArtForum (January 2009), pp. 43-44.
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embodied, an almost phenomenologically oriented history of images,
in which sensory and emotional practices already are included. Some-
what surprisingly, Baxandall only spoke of visual practices – those
were the social practices „most immediately relevant to the perception
of paintings“.17 But the practices he described were rather instances of
intersensory perception, of synaesthesia. In the merchants’ command
of gauging volume we easily recognize what many anthropologists
and other social scientists would now describe as „haptic visuality“.
Similarly, when he discusses the relevance of his merchants’ dancing
experience or their watching the actio, the bodily eloquence, of popular
preachers, he is actually describing instances of kinesthetic empathy.
No less remarkable is Baxandall’s sensitivity to the emotional hold of
the paintings. As he writes, with their stylized postural and gestural
expression of feeling the preachers coached the public in the painters’
emotional repertory, and vice versa : „fifteenth-century pictorial de-
velopment happened within fifteenth-century classes of emotional
experience“.18
Bourdieu published his essay in 1992. Since then anthropologists
studying images have recovered the idea of a corporeal aesthetics.
Like Bourdieu rejecting Kantian aesthetics, with its elevation of the
„disinterested“ beholder, they have reverted to the Aristotelian concept
of aesthesis, which unlike the Kantian notion holds that the ways we
engage with images are always bodily and multisensory.19 Hence the
anthropologist Chris Pinney’s suggestion of a „corpothetics“, studying
„the sensory embrace of images, the bodily engagement that most
people (except Kantians and modernists) have with artworks“. Other
social scientists thinking along similar lines suggested the term „so-
17Baxandall, Painting and Experience, p. 109.
18Baxandall, pp. 55-56, 66.
19See for instance: Susan Buck-Morss, Aesthetics and Anaesthetics: Walter Benjamins
Art Works Essay Reconsidered, in: October 77 (1992), pp. 3-41; Birgit Meyer and Jojada
Verrips, Aesthetics, in: David Morgan (ed.), Key Words in Religion, Media and Culture,
London 2008, pp. 20-30; David Howes, Hearing Scents, Tasting Sights: Toward a Cross-
Cultural Multimodal Theory of Aesthetics, in: Francesca Bacci and David Melcher (eds.),
Art and the Senses, Oxford 2011, pp. 161-182.
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maesthetics“ or proposed to speak of a „corporeal eye“, a „corporeal
image“ or – as Laura Marks did, drawing on the art historian Alois
Riegl – of „haptic visuality“.20 Simultaneously, various art historians,
among them David Freedberg, Michael Fried and David Morgan, have
defended a similar sensory integration of the visual. Like the social
scientists they have been influenced, the one more so than the other,
by the writings of Merleau-Ponty, while Morgan also takes a strong
interest in anthropology.21
More recently, Freedberg, known for his pioneering work on the
emotional impact of images, has taken a different track, looking in
particular at the investigations of the Italian neuroscientists Vittorio
Gallese and Giacomo Rizzolatti into mirror neurons and empathy as
confirming the more intuitive ideas on art and Einfühlung, already de-
veloped by Robert Vischer and other nineteenth-century art theorists,
including Riegl. While such an approach looks attractive if we wish to
reconstruct a culture’s native comprehension of art, with all its bodily
and sensory dimensions, it leaves little room for processes of incorpo-
ration. Instead, we had better concentrate on practice theory, with its
interest in the historical nature of skills and habits, its conceiving of
the body as always historically situated, as trained and plastic. But let
us first have a look at one of Freedberg’s essays.
4. „Culture tunes our neurons“
In this essay, published in 2008, Freedberg discusses a single work of
art, Rubens’ A Peasant Dance (1636-1640), now in the Prado.22 As
20Christopher Pinney, Piercing the Skin of the Idol, in: idem and Nicholas Thomas
(eds.), Beyond Aesthetics: Art and the Technologies of Enchantment, Oxford 2001, p.
158; Laura Marks, Touch: Sensuous Theory and Multisensory Media, Minneapolis 2002.
‘Somaesthetics’ was coined by the philosopher Richard Shusterman; ‘corporeal eye’ by
the film historian Malcolm Turvey; ‘corporeal image’ by the visual anthropologist David
MacDougall.
21See for instance: David Freedberg, Antropologia e storia dell’arte: la fine delle
discipline?, in: Richerche di Storia dellArte 94 (2008), pp. 5-18; Michael Fried, Mendel’s
Realism: Art and Embodiment in Nineteenth-Century Berlin, New Haven CT 2002;
David Morgan, The Look of the Sacred, in: Roberto Orsi (ed.), The Cambridge Compan-
ion to Religious Studies, New York 2009, pp. 296-318.
22David Freedberg, Antropologia e storia dell’arte: la fine delle discipline?, in:
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he tells us, he wants to offer a new interpretation of the painting,
one focusing on the motions of the bodies depicted and the emotions
involved. After all, how can we look at this bunch of peasants dancing
without feeling some ‘inner motion’, as he calls it, prompting us to
mimic all their movements?
Central to Freedberg’s interpretation is the so-called „simulation
theory of empathy“ that was formulated in the 1990s after Rizzolatti’s
discovery of mirror neurons in the brain. By replicating (or „mirror-
ing“) at a prereflective level the goal-directed movements of others,
these neurons allow humans – without executing the motor act them-
selves – to grasp the meaning of these movements and the related
emotions. Accordingly, in studying how we bodily engage with im-
ages, Freedberg prefers to focus on „felt movement of the body rather
than on actual movements“, on „the sense of reacting as if one were be-
having in physical ways without actually thus behaving“. Wishing to
integrate cultural and biological factors, Freedberg also recommends
the writings of Bourdieu and those of anthropologists Thomas Csor-
das, Michael Jackson, Tim Ingold and Carlo Severi, all of whom are
working in a phenomenological vein. To address the multiple relation-
ships between images, emotions, and the perception and movements
of the body, he sketches a truly interdisciplinary perspective, one that
should range from Marcel Mauss’ „ethnography of movement“ to the
„new sciences of movement“. But are these „new sciences“, the neuro-
sciences, really that relevant? Could we not simply confine ourselves
to anthropology and, of course, to the cultural history of the body,
the senses and the emotions? Do they not teach us much more about
Rubens and his Peasant Dance?
Consider a highly interesting study on how our mirror neurons
respond differently when watching dances that we have learned to do,
for which we have acquired the necessary bodily skills, and dances that
we have not. In this neuroscientific study videos of classical ballet and
Afro-Brazilian capoeira dance were shown to a group of subjects with
Richerche di Storia dell’Arte 94 (2008), pp. 5-18.
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motor experience of ballet, another one with experience of capoeira,
and a third group of non-expert control subjects. The results were
revealing: while all the subjects saw the same actions, the mirror
areas of their brains responded quite differently according to whether
they could perform the actions. The ballet dancers showed greater
activity in their mirror areas when watching ballet than when watching
capoeira moves, while the mirror areas of capoeira dancers showed
the opposite effect. For the group with no motor experience of either
ballet or capoeira, no such differences were detected. Crucial in each
case were the inculcated motor skills. As the researchers concluded,
these skills even inform the brain’s mirror mechanisms.23
In other words, culture or history matters, regardless of how fast
and automatically these mechanisms respond – another case, as prac-
tice theorists would conclude, of history turned into nature. Recently,
cultural historian Monique Scheer cautioned that we should read fMRI
scans „as images of a ‘used’ brain, one molded by the practices of a
specific culture, thus turning variations between scans of members of
different social groups into meaningful data“.24
Returning to Rubens’ A Peasant Dance, if our acquired motor skills
indeed determine the way our mirror neurons respond to the goal-
directed movements of others, then we can safely assume that the
painter’s clients, the monarchs, courtiers and wealthy merchants all
buying his art, did not feel much „inner motion“ when confronted
with his swirling peasants. As several historians have shown, most
members of the early modern elite, especially the men, were taught
from childhood on to strengthen their bodies with exercise and to incor-
porate an elegant upright bearing through dancing, fencing and riding
lessons. In other words, the dancing skills they had incorporated al-
ready from childhood on differed entirely from those incorporated by
23B Calvo-Merino a.o., Action Observation and Acquired Motor Skills: An fMRI Study
with Expert Dancers, in: Cerebral Cortex 15 (2005), 8, pp. 1243-1249.
24Monique Scheer, Are Emotions a Kind of Practice (And is That What Makes Them
Have a History)? A Bourdieuian Approach to Understanding Emotion, in: History and
Theory 51 (May 2012), p. 220.
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Rubens’ peasant folk.25 As neuropsychologist Oliver Sacks observed,
„culture tunes our neurons“.
5. Conclusion
Obviously, cultural history (or, if you like, the new historical anthro-
pology) might profit greatly from anthropologists working in a phe-
nomenological vein and from the present phenomenological turn in
general. Yet as I have tried to argue, it also has enough to offer to
the scholars (anthropologists and art historians but also psychologists,
linguists and philosophers) already involved in the turn, provided that
it focuses on the „knowing“ or the „mindful“ body, on how our bod-
ies are always infused with history, as even Descartes realized while
playing the lute. Numerous other early modern authors reflected on
such issues as well, often in treatises on medicine but also on all kinds
of bodily skills, from dancing, fencing and horse-riding to swimming,
wrestling or even drawing and painting. These and other authors also
discussed the senses and the emotions in ways that remind us more of
William James and his interest in habituation than of the generations of
psychologists after him. In sum, if we want to understand such texts
and to trace which bodily, sensory and emotional equipment men and
women in early modern Europe brought to pictures, a fresh look at
practice theory (starting with a re-reading of Baxandall’s pioneering
study) will certainly help.
25Georges Vigarello, The Upward Training of the Body from the Age of Chivalry to
Courtly Civility, in: Michel Feher (ed.), Fragments for a History of the Human Body,
New York 1989, pp. 149-106; Herman Roodenburg, The Eloquence of the Body: Studies
on Gesture in the Dutch Republic, Zwolle 2004; in an essay written four years ago but
only published this year, I expressed a more positive view on the simulation theory of
empathy. See Herman Roodenburg, The Visceral Pleasures of Looking. On Iconology,
Anthropology, and the Neurosciences, in: Barbara Baert a.o. (eds.), New Perspectives in
Iconology: Visual Studies and Anthropology, Brussels 2012, pp. 211-229.
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